“Trust Me” is Not a Cost-Cutting Reform

This post was originally written for Americans for Tax Reform’s Blog, where I am an Associate (intern).

This weekend, the CBO shot down another hollow Obama administration “savings” proposal.  Obama’s budget director Peter Orszag endorsed an Independent Medicare Advisory Council (IMAC), which would have transferred some authority to the executive to reduce Medicare expenses (probably by reducing payments to doctors).

Savings might not be realized at all because the proposal specifies a process without specific goals for savings or a “fall-back” plan for ensuring spending reductions if the combination of annual IMAC recommendations and Presidential approval does not produce hoped-for savings.

To translate for the CBO: “Trust me” is not a savings proposal.  IMAC is a vague promise to figure out, at some unspecified date in the future, some unspecified way of generating an unspecified amount of savings.  Congress and Obama might as well just admit that they don’t want to deal with the hard, important stuff now.  To be nice, CBO scored the proposal for just $2 billion in savings over the next ten years.

Democrat policy cheerleaders like Ezra Klein have complained that Americans aren’t paying enough attention to supposed-cost control measures.  There’s a good reason Americans aren’t impressed.  The cost-cutting reforms just aren’t serious and the draft health care bills prove it.  The Democratic “reform” proposals are larded with massive subsidies that cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year.  Why?  Because if they smother the health care industry with money they can make costs look like they are decreasing – for a while.

If Democrats believed their proposals actually cut costs, they wouldn’t need the subsidies.  Alternatively, if they were confident that measures like IMAC actually produced budgetary savings, they could make subsidies floating and dependent on CBO measurements of actually attained savings.  Until the subsidies go away or are linked to attained savings, it is reasonable to assume that Democrats don’t take their own reforms seriously.  With the stakes this high, “trust me” is not an option.

Crowding out the Market

Public-plan proponents have feigned ignorance of how such an option would crowd out the public market.  The answer is simple: a public plan would be a political, not a market, entity.  Its justification is premised on a belief that the insurance market is not competitive and that insurers price oligopolistically, retaining excessive profits.  Even if this were true, the public plan would have no way of knowing when it had priced away its more efficient market competitors’ oligopolistic profits.  It would not know that it had destroyed these “inefficient” profits until it had lowered its premium prices to a level too low for private insurers to match.  Or, as a flowchart:

public-flowchart

It is inevitable that the government will stack the deck in favor of its own offering.  Even if it is not openly subsidized, the public plan will almost certainly be able to outsource expensive administrative duties to government bureaucracies with their own operating budgets.  It will likely have powers to impose its prices on providers that its private competitors will not.  And it is absurd to think that the government would simply allow its plan to disappear if it failed to operate within its budget.  The public plan’s political structure and mandate to drive down prices blindly guarantees that a bailout will be needed sooner rather than later.

Entitlement Growth

This is one of my favorite Heritage charts:

The projections for the growth in these programs are pretty staggering – and worth taking a look into later.  Yesterday, Christina Romer (Chair of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers) testified before the House Committee on the Budget.   She said that only a small part of the growth in Medicare spending was attributable to demographic people (more old people needing health care and living longer), and that most was due to the increased cost of health care (page 4 of this link).

The graph above seems to contradict that claim.  Why would Medicare grow so much faster than Medicaid if demographic changes were not a very large part of the cost increase?  I don’t know whether Ms. Romer is correct.  I’ll probably be rooting through the CBO’s website later this week to see how exactly they came up with their numbers.

ATR: Obama’s Health Care Bait and Switch

I have a new post up on ATR’s blog on “Obama’s Health Care Bait and Switch”.  A clip:

If you want more of something, subsidize it. If you want less of something, tax it. Obama’s plan to provide an “affordable” (read: subsidized) public insurance option is guaranteed to increase health care spending. His plan to tax the wealthy is just as sure to discourage entrepreneurship and prolong the recession.

Disclosure: I am currently an ATR Associate (intern).

Buried Treasure Health Care Profits

Matthew Yglesias gives a pretty standard defense of a public health care plan:

A public option that strives to achieve public goals—quality care at an affordable price—will challenge private industry to do a better job. Then competition between plans will drive improvements in quality and efficiency. Without a public option, the risk is that private plans will compete by trying to screen out sick patients. That’s a viable root to private sector profits, but it does nothing to improve quality or control costs.

Yglesias treats “quality and efficiency” and “screening out sick patients” as mutually exclusive routes to profit.  But they are not.  The free market is not simply satisfied with one source of profit to the neglect of others.  Firms will try to cut both kinds of costs – the costs of treating the sick and the costs of treatment in general. They make more money that way.

A public plan does not solve the dilemma of paying for sick policy holders.  If the private market prices them out into the public plan, the public plan will be forced to pay for its higher average patient costs through premiums or subsidies.  When the public plan raises premiums, the healthy will flee to cheaper private plans, perpetuating the cycle.  When it subsidizes the treatment of the sick, it does not “control” costs (in fact, a subsidy incentivizes more consumption of health care, increasing overall costs), it justs forcibly redistributes them.

If there is truly no competition in the health care market (a possible explanation for “buried treasure” health care profits – all we have to do is start digging), the most likely culprit is the maze of state regulations that segment the national market and shackle insurers with mandates.  The actual solution to this problem is to break down state barriers and reduce the number of regulations and mandates – but this answer does not lead to a redistributive system, so progressives will ignore it.

Public Plan Poll

David Kopel of Volokh points to this troubling poll in the National Journal:

Left-leaning (18 votes) Right-leaning (12 votes)
Excluding it would be a deal-breaker: 72.2%
I want it, but inclusion is not essential: 27.8%
I oppose it, but exclusion is not essential: 0%
Including it would be a deal-breaker: 0%
Excluding it would be a deal-breaker: 8.3%
I want it, but inclusion is not essential: 0%
I oppose it, but exclusion is not essential: 25%
Including it would be a deal-breaker: 58.3%
Unsure (volunteered): 8.3%

Only 58.3% of conservative bloggers consider a public plan to be a “deal-breaker”?  I’m a little bit unclear what that phrase is supposed to mean, but I assume it indicates a proposal so noxious that conservatives would simply refuse to cooperate with its passage.

Here’s a quote from a conservative who is “opposed” but doesn’t consider it a deal-breaker:

“Public insurance can be available for those who want/need it, but it should in no way take away choices from individuals for private insurance.” D.S. Hube, The Colossus Of Rhodey

A public plan is socialized medicine by inches.  It is probably impossible to guarantee both that public insurance be available and that it not interfere with private choice “in any way”.  Either the public plan will be allowed to go bankrupt if it runs out of money (and won’t be available), or it will be subsidized and price out the private market (limiting choice).  As Kopel explains:

“The government insurance program would inevitably benefit from taxpayer subsidies, making it less expensive, in the short run, than independent plans. Over time, the independent plans would be driven out of business, and even before then, many employers would force their employees into the government program. As private competition is eliminated, the imposition of Canadian-style rationing becomes feasible.” David Kopel, The Volokh Conspiracy

I’m not sure that conservatives understand what they are up against.  They need to be opposed to this, and united in their opposition, if they want to have any chance of stopping the redistributive state’s next advance.

Free Riding as Coverage

A few posts ago I talked about the free rider problem in Obama’s healthcare plan.

I’m not sure whether Obama understands the potential impact of that problem.   But he clearly embraces its basic mechanism as a positive feature.

In the Democratic debates, Obama slammed Hillary for proposing a health care plan that included mandates – a requirement that everyone buy health care for themselves.

OBAMA: … Let’s take health care. About 95 percent of our plans are similar. We both set up a government plan that would allow people who otherwise don’t have health insurance because of a preexisting condition, like my mother had, or at least what the insurance said was a preexisting condition, let them get health insurance. We both want to emphasize prevention, because we’ve got to do something about ever escalating costs and we don’t want children, who I meet all the time, going to emergency rooms for treatable illnesses like asthma….

What [people are] struggling with is they can’t afford the health care. And so I emphasize reducing costs. My belief is that if we make it affordable, if we provide subsidies to those who can’t afford it, they will buy it.  Senator Clinton has a different approach. She believes that we have to force people who don’t have health insurance to buy it. Otherwise, there will be a lot of people who don’t get it.  I don’t see those folks.

And I think that it is important for us to recognize that if, in fact, you are going to mandate the purchase of insurance and it’s not affordable, then there’s going to have to be some enforcement mechanism that the government uses. And they may charge people who already don’t have health care fines, or have to take it out of their paychecks. And that, I don’t think, is helping those without health insurance. That is a genuine difference.

Obama recognizes the obvious: if you force people to buy health care, they are going to have to pay for it (and you will probably need fines to prevent people from dodging costs).  So he glosses his lack of mandates as a charitable feature.  It is unkind to force everyone to pay for health care – but people who don’t want to pay for it should get it anyway.  And Obama makes it clear that they will:

CUMMINGS: … the truth is that most Democrats really do want full coverage, everybody covered. Now, Senator Obama, this is a question for you. Under your plan, which is voluntary, it creates incentives for people to buy, but still is voluntary. There would be around — about 15 million people who would still not be covered….

OBAMA: Well, understand who we’re talking about here. Every expert who looks at it says anybody who wants health care will be able to get health care under my plan. There won’t be anybody out there who wants health care who will not be able to get it. That’s point number one….

So Obama recognizes the fundamental aspects of free riding.  It’s a feature – not a bug.

At one point, Blitzer forced Obama to acknowledge the problem.  Here’s the exchange:

BLITZER: Senator Obama, let me just fine-tune the question, because I know you want to respond. On this issue of mandates, those who don’t, whether it’s 10 million or 15 million, those who could afford it but don’t wind up buying health insurance for one reason or another, they wind up getting sick, they go to an emergency room, all of us wind up paying for their health care. That’s the biggest criticism that’s been leveled at your plan.

OBAMA: If people are gaming the system, there are ways we can address that. By, for example, making them pay some of the back premiums for not having gotten it in the first place. But understand that, number one, Hillary says that she’s got enough subsidies. Well, we priced out both our plan and Senator Clinton’s plan, and some of the subsidies are not going to be sufficient. Point number one.

Obama is speaking out of both sides of his mouth.  On the one hand, he makes a vague promise to maybe deal with the problem by something that sounds suspiciously like a fine.  On the other, he trashes Clinton for proposing fines.  What distinguishes those who don’t make voluntary health care payments for legitimate reasons from those who refrain because they are “gaming the system” (i.e. behaving rationally)?  Likely their income: if you are rich, Obama reserves the right to force you to pay both for your health care and that of people who don’t pay into the plan (the poor).

Either Obama genuinely intends to let people choose to defect from health care premiums (thus creating a free rider problem), or he is offering false choice (people can choose to defect, but if they “choose wrong” the choice will be taken away).  His plan is either incompetent or dishonest.  Either way, Obama is selling income redistribution, colorfully repackaged into free rider problems and surreptitiously targeted mandates.  Do Americans understand what they are buying?

NOTE: I’ve added emphasis to the quotes throughout.

UPDATE:  Oops.  I originally misidentified the economic problem as moral hazard, when it is actually a free rider problem.  This doesn’t change the analysis, just the terminology.  Moral hazard is a different, more traditional problem caused by insurance.

Obama’s Redistributive Healthcare Plan

It’s already clear that Obama’s tax plan is redistributive.  How about his healthcare plan? 

What is the Obama platform on this issue?  You can read what his campaign website describes as the full plan here.

The platform promises to do a lot of different things.  I have no particular expertise in healthcare policy, so I won’t attempt to comment on all of them.  I just want to point out two general ways in which Obama’s plan makes America’s healthcare significantly more redistributive, or, as we are saying nowadays, “socialist“.

First, Obama openly promises to expand government-subsidized and government-provided healthcare.  In point 6 of the second section of his plan, he promises to expand SCHIP and Medicaid.  These are unambiguously redistributive welfare programs that provide healthcare funds to low income individuals (Medicaid) or low and middle-income children (SCHIP).  In point 4 of the first section of his plan, he promises to subsidize the costs of catastrophic illness.  Because the costs of catastrophic illness are evenly distributed (let’s imagine) among the various income brackets, but the funds come disproportionately from the higher income brackets (because of income taxation), government catastrophic coverage will certainly redistribute and might fairly be called socialism.

Second, Obama’s creation of government insurance that covers pre-existing conditions creates a massive loophole and accomplishes an underhanded establishment of universal (socialist) healthcare.  How does it do this?  In three steps:

  • The plan assumes the creation of a new public healthcare policy.  I can’t find an actual explanation of the new public insurance policy that will be offered anywhere in the Obama healthcare platform (perhaps the document is intentionally vague?), but numerous sections assume it, perhaps most importantly, point 2 of the second section:

    Through the Exchange, any American will have the opportunity to
    enroll in the new public plan or an approved private plan…

  • The Obama platform requires private insurers to provide coverage to pre-existing conditions in point 1 of the second section. Because the platform does not explain the new public plan, it is unclear whether it will also cover pre-existing conditions.  It seems a fair assumption that it would; it is unlikely that Obama would offer a public plan that was less comprehensive than private plans could legally be.
  • The plan would almost certainly be government-subsidized.  Subscribers to the public plan would not be paying as much in premiums, altogether, as they would be receiving from it in insurance payments. Again, Obama does not describe the plan explicitly, so it is impossible to be sure, but on at least two occasions he describes the plan in such a way as to suggest it will be subsidized (though the words subsidy and subsidize never appear in the platform).  The new public policy would be funded by fines of certain businesses:

    The Obama-Biden plan provides new affordable health insurance options by… requiring all large employers to contribute towards health coverage for their employees or towards the cost of the public plan…

    And the new plan is referred to as a “federally supported” one and grouped together with Medicare and Medicaid:

    …federally supported health plans, including Medicare, Medicaid,
    SCHIP and the new public plan…

    In any event, the mere supposition that the public plan would be “affordable” would demand that there be some sort of subsidy, as I discuss below.

So how do these three steps create de facto universalized healthcare?  By creating a free rider problem and patching it over with subsidies.

By covering pre-existing conditions, the public plan removes most of the incentive Americans have to actually buy health insurance.  If you can sign up for public insurance once you get sick, you have little reason to sign up while still healthy.  Rather, you have a strong disincentive, because you would have to pay a monthly insurance premium, a premium that buys you nothing that you couldn’t sign up for later.

If people approached the system (economically) rationally, they would not sign up unless they were sick.  If all the policy holders were sick, the average cost to the insurer (the United States) would become very high because there would be no healthy policy holders to help pay the bills of the unhealthy.  The insurer (the United States) could get money to pay these costs in two different ways.  It could get it from the policy holders (a premium), or it could get it from the citizens of the United States (a tax).

Barack Obama’s goal in setting up the public plan seems to be to offer an “affordable alternative” to private healthcare plans – or at least, sentiments about the unaffordability of the private system litter his proposal, and it is a fair inference that he means his own plan to be cheaper.

Thus, Obama is precluded from raising the funds for healthcare through premiums.  Premiums for a policy held only by sick people must be higher than premiums for a policy held by a mix of healthy and sick people.  His public plan will have to be supported by a massive subsidy – and a subsidy implies a tax.

A plan with these characteristics becomes de facto univeral healthcare.  You don’t have to pay for it (or you pay very little, i.e. only when sick – but one could think of this as almost a high deductible), it is funded by taxpayer money, and it is available to all citizens.  Because the taxpayer money will likely come from the payroll tax, there will necessarily be a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor.  True, it’s a messy system, and leaves open plenty of ways for irrational actors to punish themselves if they don’t understand how to game the system (i.e. if they are responsible and buy healthcare while healthy), but it is nonetheless universal.

I’m unsure whether or not Obama realizes the significance of the free rider problem in this plan.  My guess is that he is aware.  He probably views it as a politically feasible way of tacitly enacting a universal system.  I oppose universalized healthcare in any case, but it is particularly to Obama’s discredit that he would surreptitiously advance it through a misunderstood free rider problem.

UPDATE: As a final note, consider that Obama’s healthcare plan would do much to socialize insurance in the academic sense of the word.  It is unclear whether private insurance carriers will be able to compete with the public plan.  We can take as given that the public plan will be as cheap or cheaper than current insurance plans (given Obama’s stated intention of providing an “affordable” alternative).  Surely private insurers won’t have access to the same subsidies as the government, so they won’t be able to compete in pricing.  At the same time, their costs will be driven up by the loss of healthy customers – their break-even premium will be higher than in today’s market, while Obama promises insurance with a cheaper premium.  It is more than feasible that ObamaCare would drive a large part of the insurance industry out of the market, leaving it firmly in the government’s hands.

UPDATE II:  Oops.  I originally misidentified the economic problem as moral hazard, when it is actually a free rider problem.  This doesn’t change the analysis, just the terminology.  Moral hazard is a different, more traditional problem caused by insurance.

Also, I have more about Obama’s healthcare plan here.